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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades the investigation of framing effects has become the foremost studied 
phenomenon of rational/irrational decision making. Two experiments were conducted to 
determine whether the functional specializations of the left and the right hemispheres would 
produce different responses to a traditional framing task. In Experiment 1, a behavioral task of 
finger tapping was used to induce asymmetrical activation of the respective hemispheres. In 
Experiment 2, a monaural listening procedure was used. In both experiments, the predicted 
results were found. Framing effects were found when the right hemisphere was selectively 
activated whereas they were not observed when the left hemisphere was selectively activated. 
The results are interpreted in light of a dual-processing 
approach of decision-making. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades the issue of framing has become of 
paramount interest in many different areas of decision 
making (see Kuhberger, 1998 for review). Framing refers 
to situations where participants are presented with 
options that are framed either positively or negatively 
and each of the options has the same expected outcome. 
In a typical risky choice framing task, participants are 
forced to make a choice between a risk-free and a riskseeking 
option (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). 
The typical finding from a risky choice decision task 
is that people tend to choose the risk-free option when 
the problem is framed positively and the risk-seeking 
option when the problem is framed negatively. Because 
most people demonstrate this reversal of preference, 
basing their decision on the frame rather than the expected 
outcome, the framing effect has become one of 
the most widely tested examples of irrationality in decision 
making. 
 
 
1.1. Framing research 
 
Seminal work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
sparked interest into research investigating the risky 
choice framing paradigm. Kahneman and Tversky put 
forth prospect theory as a theoretical model for explaining 
why these types of gain/loss framing effects 
occur. Since that time researchers have used many different 
variations of the risky choice framing task. 
However, the foremost studied example of framing is 
that of the Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). In the Asian disease scenario, participants 
are asked to consider the following problem: 
 
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. In the 
gains condition, participants are faced with a risk-free option 
(200 people will be saved) and a risk-seeking option (a one-third 
probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability 
that no people will be saved). Similarly, participants in the 
losses condition are also faced with a risk-free (400 people will 
die) and a risk-seeking option (one-third probability that nobody 
will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die). 
 
The finding for this traditional framing task is that 
participants in the gains condition tend to choose the 
risk-free option (200 people saved) whereas participants 
in the losses condition tend to choose the risk-seeking 
option (one-third probability that nobody will die and a 
two-thirds probability that 600 will die). This type of 
decision choice is considered irrational because the expected 
outcome of lives between the risk-free and riskseeking 
option is the same in both the gains (200 saved) 
and losses (400 die) conditions. Therefore, there should 
be no difference between the two conditions in risk-free 
or risk-seeking choices. The finding that such a reversal 
in choice exists attests to the fact that participants are 
relying upon the frame to make their choice rather than 
the expected outcome. A reliance on the frame rather 
than the expected outcome is considered irrational by 
traditional models of rational decision-making. 
 
 
1.2. Prospect theory 
 
Most theoretical models of decision-making focus on 
a strictly logical approach, relying only on the net assets 
of the outcomes (e.g., Machina, 1982; Savage, 1954; Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Prospect theory, on 
the other hand, focuses on changes from the status quo 
and is sensitive to relative differences of gains and losses. 
And it is this evaluative sensitivity to gains and losses 
that provides the basis for interpreting framing effects. 
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the decision 
making process is dichotomous, consisting of two phases. 
The initial phase involves coding the options as 
gains or losses relative to a neutral reference point. In 
the subsequent phase the subjective values and weighted 
probabilities for each of the options are evaluated in 
light of the prior editing phase. The options are then 
contrasted relative to each other. Framing effects in the 
evaluation phase are depicted by the S-shaped value 
function. The shape of this function is concave for gains 
and convex for losses. This depicts prospect theory’s 
prediction of risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for 
losses. 
 
 
1.3. Framing limitations 
 
Researchers investigating framing effects have supported 
its potency across many different areas of research 
including medical decisions (e.g., McNeil, 
Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; O’Connor, Pennie, & 
Dales, 1996), monetary decisions (Fagley & Miller, 
1997), and taxes (Highhouse & Paese, 1996). The finding 
that most people tend to rely upon the frame rather than 
the expected outcome across these different areas attests 
to the robustness of the effect. Although framing effects 
have been found in many different areas of research, an 
almost equal number of studies within these areas have 
reported weak or non-existent framing effects (e.g., 
Bless, Betsch, & Franzen, 1998; Fagley & Miller, 1997; 
O’Connor et al., 1996). Therefore, across many domains, 
the framing effect appears to be limited by certain 
cognitive and contextual boundaries. 
 
Recently, research by McElroy and Seta (2003) has 
demonstrated that both cognitive and contextual factors 
can determine whether framing effects are evinced in a 
decision-making task. McElroy and Seta demonstrated 
that when individuals either had a personality disposition 
toward or were induced through the self-relevance 
of the decision task to engage a framing task more analytically, 
typical framing effects were not found. Conversely, 
when individuals had a personality disposition 
toward or were induced through relevance to engage a 
framing task holistically, the typical framing effects were 
found. 
 
McElroy and Seta interpret these results as evidence 
for a dual analytic-holistic processing perspective. That 
is, when individuals engage a decision task with an analytic 
processing style they rely upon a logical, systematic 
analysis of each of the options. Consequently, this type 
of analysis is especially sensitive to analytic information, 
such as the numeric potentiation of the alternatives, and 
relatively insensitive to contextual information. And 
because the alternatives are of exactly the same expected 
value, there should be no difference between the gains 
and losses conditions. Conversely, individuals who 
engage the same task with a holistic processing style are 
especially sensitive to contextual cues and relatively 
insensitive to analytic information. Because of this, 
holistically focused individuals are sensitive to the frame, 
and the predicted framing effects occur. 
Following this line of research, the current studies 
were designed to test the analytic/holistic analysis at the 
level of hemispheric specialization. Specifically, we 
wanted to explore whether the functional specializations 
of the respective hemispheres would produce different 
types of responses to a traditional framing task. 
 
 
1.4. Hemispheric approach 
 
The findings of hemispheric specialization indicate 
that the two hemispheres engage in two very different 
forms of information processing. Research on the activities 
of the left hemisphere reveal a mode of processing 
that is logical and analytical (e.g., Bergson, 1965; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Quintanar, 1982; Ornstein, 1977). 
Numerous studies have shown that the left hemisphere’s 
mode of processing consistently breaks information 
down into different analyzable parts. The information is 
first reduced to a discreet form and then systematically 
analyzed in an orderly and logical fashion. In so doing, 
the option with the greatest numeric weight is systematically 
chosen. 
 
The right hemisphere, on the other hand, is often 
associated with being ‘‘holistic’’ in nature (Kitchens, 
1991; Levy, 1974). Recent research investigating hemispheric 
specializations however, have provided a more 
in-depth analysis of right hemispheric processing and 
thus, a more definitive explanation of this hemisphere’s 
‘‘holistic’’ style. For example, Brownell and colleagues 
(e.g., Brownell, Carroll, Rehak, & Wingfield, 1992; 
Brownell, Pincus, Blum, Rehak, & Winner, 1997) have 
investigated the role of the right hemisphere in comprehending 
language and suggest that the right hemisphere 
has the role of referencing terms within which 
conversations are understood. Cues such as status, familiarity, 
and formality serve as terms of reference that 
the right hemisphere uses to properly orient individuals 
in a conversational setting. 
 
Drawing upon findings from many different areas of 
research, Ornstein (1997) proposes that the right hemisphere 
plays the primary role in understanding context. 
It uses cues within the context to ‘‘weave’’ together 
meaning from encountered stimuli. Although Ornstein 
did not directly discuss the role of framing, it seems 
logically consistent that the right hemisphere should be 
particularly sensitive to the frame in which information 
is presented. Therefore, in accordance with this line of 
reasoning, we view the role of the right hemisphere as 
one of contextual referencing, one that is relatively less 
involved in problem analysis and relatively more involved 
in determining the framework within which the 
information will be analyzed. Specifically, we see the 
right hemisphere fitting encountered information into a 
referenced frame within which the problem is analyzed 
and meaning is derived. Thus, it’s ‘‘holistic’’ nature may 
lie in its ability to engage in contextual referencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5. Contralateral hemispheric activation 
 
One particular phenomenon that has grown out of 
the hemispheric research deals with activation of the 
hemisphere opposite or contralateral from the side of 
the body (corporal hemispace) where attention is being 
directed. For example, when attention is directed toward 
the right side of the body, the left hemisphere should 
become relatively more activated and vice versa. The 
beginning of this phenomenon has its roots in animal 
research (e.g., Myers, 1956; Van Wagenen & Herren, 
1940) but its importance for understanding human behavior 
was not recognized until the work of Kinsbourne 
(1970). In his activation–orientation hypothesis, Kinsbourne 
suggests that asymmetrical activation of either 
hemisphere can cause contralateral attention (e.g., eye 
or hand movements). Later research showed that the 
opposite could also occur. That is, lateral orientation of 
attention proved to be an effective means for selectively 
inducing relatively greater activation of the respective 
contralateral hemisphere (e.g., Bowers, Heilman, & Van 
Den Abell, 1981; Malamed & Larsen, 1977; Walker, 
Wade, & Waldman, 1982). Researchers, relying upon 
this line of reasoning, have suggested that motor and 
sensory asymmetries found in the prenatal period may 
set the stage for later functional lateralization (e.g., 
Corballis, 1983; Kinsbourne & Hiscock, 1983). This 
early development suggests a profound, early propensity 
for hemispatial motor and sensory connections to the 
contralateral hemisphere. Later work using EEG supported 
this view by demonstrating that lateral closed-eye 
movements are an indicator of relatively greater activity 
in the contralateral hemispheric (De Toffolo, Autret, 
Gaymaard, & Degiovanni, 1992). This line of research 
has resulted in the use of lateralized attentional tasks as 
a means of selectively observing the influences of the 
respective hemispheres. 
 
The predictions from this reasoning are straightforward. 
When attentional direction is aligned with a particular 
corporal hemispace, the contralateral hemisphere 
is relatively ‘‘hyperactive’’ and the ipsilateral hemisphere 
is relatively ‘‘hypoactive.’’ As a consequence of this relationship, 
the relatively hyperactive hemisphere is especially 
prominent and influential, thereby allowing it to 
impinge its own particular specializations (or limitations) 
on the task at hand. The end result is that the 
relatively hyperactive hemisphere takes a leading role in 
information processing and predominately influences 
the eventual outcome of a given task. 
 
1.6. Overview of Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Prior research has shown that when individuals process 
a decision task using the analytic style they are 
relatively insensitive to the way in which a problem is 
framed whereas when they process the same task with a 
holistic or contextual referencing style, framing effects 
are demonstrated (McElroy & Seta, 2003). According to 
our hypothesis, individuals who are induced to have a 
relatively active left hemisphere should process the decision 
task using an analytic style and the framing of the 
task should have little or no influence on their decisions. 
The situation should be much different for those individuals 
who have a relatively active right hemisphere. 
For these individuals, the way in which the task is 
framed should have a pronounced influence on their 
decisions and commonly observed framing effects 
should be obtained. In both of our experiments we tested 
our hypothesis by manipulating relative activation 
of the respective hemispheres. In Experiment 1, we utilized 
the simple behavioral method of finger tapping; in 
Experiment 2, we used the monaural listening procedure. 
Converging evidence will be obtained if the participants 
who were induced to have a relatively more 
active right hemisphere manifest customary framing 
effects whereas those participants who were induced to 
have a relatively more active left hemisphere do not. 
 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In Experiment 1, we induced the functional specializations 
of the respective hemispheres by capitalizing on 
the behavioral method of finger tapping. Consistent 
with prior assumptions (e.g., Bourgeois, Christman, & 
Horowitz, 1998; Reuter-Lorenz, Kinsbourne, & Moscovitch, 
1990), we expect that when a participant’s 
hemisphere is in a state of relatively greater activation, 
they will process a decision task with the thought style 
associated with the respective hemisphere. Therefore, 
although both hemispheres will quickly share information, 
the hemisphere that is relatively hyperactive should 
‘‘taint’’ perceivers’ thought processes with its own respective 
cognitive style. 
 
The hemispheric activation method requires that attentional 
focus be directed on the side of the body opposite 
to the selected hemisphere. Researchers have used a 
variety of methods to manipulate an attentional focus on 
both the left and right side of the body or ‘‘corporal 
hemispace.’’ These methods, according to Kinsbourne 
(1970) and others (Bowers et al., 1981; Malamed & Larsen, 
1977; Walker et al., 1982), should be a reliable indicator 
of contralateral hemispheric activation. Examples 
include conjugated lateral eye movements (Gur & Reivich, 
1980); language induced right bias (Bowers & Heilman, 
1976; Kimura, 1973; Kinsbourne, 1974), and hand 
positioning/movements (Parsons, Gabrieli, Phelps, & 
Gazzaniga, 1998). We used a hand movement manipulation 
of finger tapping to induce attentional hyperactivation 
of the left and right hemispheres in Experiment 1. 
 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants and design 
 
Forty-six female and five male undergraduate students 
participated in this study as part of a class project. 
The study was conducted while participants were in a 
group in a large room. Participants were divided into 
two relative hemispheric activation conditions (left/ 
right). This division was based on seating arrangement. 
The experimental material was then randomized so that 
each person had an equal probability of being represented 
in each of the experimental conditions. Selective 
hemispheric activation via finger tapping served as our 2 
hemispheric activation (left/right) condition. The framing 
of the Asian disease problem in terms of either gains 
or losses served as our 2 framing (gain/loss) condition. 
2.1.2. Behavioral hemispheric-activation manipulation 
Simple behavioral tasks, when hemispacially 
performed, normally serve to direct attention to the 
respective corporal hemispace. Therefore, one way of 
selectively inducing relative hemispheric activation is by 
having participants perform a simple behavioral task. 
One such example involves hand movements. Studies 
have shown that specific hand movements increase cerebral 
blood flow in the contralateral hemisphere (e.g., 
Cramer, Finkelstein, Schaechter, Bush, & Rosen, 1999; 
Halsey, Blaunstenin, Wilson, & Wills, 1979), which is an 
indicator of increased contralateral hemispheric activity. 
Therefore, in order to selectively induce relative hyperactivation 
of the respective hemispheres, we had participants 
continuously tap either their left or right 
fingers until after they had made their decision. 
 
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
 
Participants were separated into either the left hemisphere 
activation (right finger tapping) or right hemisphere 
activation (left finger tapping) condition based 
upon random seating arrangement. Stimulus materials 
were placed face down on the desk in front of each participant. 
Participants were first told that the experimenter 
was interested in their opinion regarding the information 
that they would be receiving. Participants were then told 
that during this experiment they were to tap their fingers. 
If they were seated on the left side (instructors view) they 
were told to tap their right finger and if they were seated 
on the right side (instructors view) they were told to tap 
their left finger. Participants were instructed that they 
should tap their respective fingers before they began, 
during the task, and to continue tapping until after they 
had made their decision. Participants were then told that 
they should indicate their choice on the paper located in 
front of them only after they had made their decision. 
Individual participation in the finger tapping conditions 
was monitored until the study was completed.1 
 
The stimulus material contained the classic Asian 
disease problem developed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981), framed either in terms of gains or losses. After 
participants had made their decision, they were debriefed 
and all materials were collected. 
 
 
2.2. Results and discussion: Experiment 1 
 
Three participants were not included in our analysis 
because their ranking on our handedness questionnaire 
indicated that they were primarily left-handed. This 
questionnaire was adapted from Peters (1998). We used 
the 10 items that were shown in Peters (1998) factor 
analysis to be the best discriminators of handedness. 
These same questions were used for both studies 1 and 2. 
We performed a nominal logistic v2 analysis on participants’ 
decisions. This analysis revealed a main effect 
for gain/loss framing, X2(1, N = 48) = 6:02, p < :05 as 
well as the predicted left/right hemisphere activation 
x gain/loss framing interaction, X2(1, N = 48) = 
5:19, p < .05.2 The decisions of participants in the left 
hemisphere activation (right finger tapping) condition 
were insensitive to the framing of the task. In this situation, 
the framing of options, either in terms of gains or 
losses, had no significant impact on whether participants 
chose the risk-averse option (option A) or the risk-seeking 
option (option B), X2(1, N = 23) = .02 p > .8 
(see Table 1). Regardless of framing, there was a general 
risk-aversion trend; participants chose the risk-averse 
option more often than the risk-seeking option, X2(1, N 
= 23) = 8.67, p < .01. 
 
 
 
The decisions of participants in the right hemisphere 
activation (left finger tapping) condition were especially 
sensitive to the gain/loss framing manipulation, X2(1, N 
= 25) = 8.4, p < .01. In the gains condition, participants 
demonstrated risk aversion by choosing the risk-averse 
option more often (92%), X2(1, N = 13) = 56.7, 
p < .001 than the risk-seeking option whereas an opposite 
pattern emerged in the losses condition; participants 
in this condition chose the risk-seeking option 
more often than the risk-averse option (75%), 
X2(1, N = 12) = 13.18, p < .001. These results suggest 
that framing effects can be dependent upon the particular 
hemispheric processing style that an individual uses 
when performing a decision task. When the right 
hemisphere was induced to have relatively greater activation, 
it impinged its processing style on the decision 
task and participants’ decisions were heavily influenced 
by contextual cues. Consequently, participants’ decisions 
were influenced by the way in which the decision 
was framed. However, when the left hemisphere was 
induced to have relatively greater activation, it impinged 
its own analytic processing style and framing effects 
were weak or non-existent. 
 
 
3. EXPERIMENT 2 
 
In Experiment 1, our decision-making task was relatively 
simple. Consequently, its successful completion 
did not require large amounts of cognitive capacity. This 
is important because some studies (e.g., Low & Rebert, 
1978) have found that tasks requiring large amounts of 
cognitive capacity can place a high processing load on 
their respective contralateral control centers and as a 
result, the opposite hemisphere ‘‘picks-up’’ the processing 
of the task. For example, left finger tapping in a 
complex task could overload the right hemisphere 
leading the left hemisphere to dominate the processing 
of the task. Because the task used in Experiment 1 was 
relatively simple, it is extremely unlikely that our behavioral 
manipulation of finger tapping overloaded the 
contralateral hemisphere. Nevertheless, in Experiment 2, 
we used a monaural listening procedure to provide a 
further test of our hypothesis concerning the role that 
hemispheric style plays in decision-making. 
 
The monaural listening procedure is passive and effort- 
free in that it induces lateral orientation of attention 
without a behavioral component (see Henry, 1983 for 
review). Therefore, it not only serves to induce relative 
activation of a particular hemisphere, it also allows the 
activated hemisphere freedom from cognitive load. 
Consequently, it allows the hemisphere that is activated 
to impinge its particular style of processing on the task 
(e.g., Bourgeois et al., 1998; De Toffolo et al., 1992; 
Drake & Seligman, 1989). Therefore, even though both 
hemispheres are involved in the task, the hemisphere 
that is selectively activated should taint the process with 
its own particular processing style. Experiment 2 was 
designed with these considerations in mind. 
 
 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1. Participants and design 
 
Forty-two female and six male participants took part 
in the study. Participants received credit for their participation 
as part of their class research requirement. 
The design of this study was similar to that used in 
Study 1. We employed a 2 (side of aural presentation: 
left vs. right) x 2 (framing of outcome: gains vs. losses) 
between-participants factorial design. In each condition, 
participants were asked to choose between a risk-seeking 
and a risk-averse option. 
 
3.1.2. Monaural listening procedure 
 
In the monaural listening procedure stimulus material 
is presented monaurally to either the left or right ear. 
This technique has been shown to be a very reliable 
means for investigating hemispheric asymmetries (e.g., 
Drake, 1987, 1993; Drake & Crow, 1989; Henry, 1983; 
Hines & Martindale, 1974; Hiscock, Hampson, Wong, 
& Kinsbourne, 1985; Hughes & Zimba, 1985; Morais & 
Bertelson, 1975) and consistently shows initial enhancement 
of the contralateral hemisphere. Because this 
technique is designed to produce directional shifts in 
attention, the critical component is not ear-of-entry. 
Rather, the critical component is that attention is directed 
toward the corporal hemispace contralateral to 
the targeted hemisphere. Therefore, as long as hemispacial 
attention is maintained, hyperactivation of the 
contralateral hemisphere should occur (e.g., De Toffolo 
et al., 1992; Tressoldi & Cusumano, 1992). The consequential 
result, then, should be that the hemisphere that 
is contralateral to ear of entry should be hyperactive and 
impinge its particular thinking style on the decision task. 
 
 
3.1.3. Procedure 
 
Participants were seated separately in a room. The 
number of participants in each session ranged from 2 to 
4 and each group was randomized so that each participant 
had an equal chance of being represented in each 
condition. The room was partitioned so that participants 
could not see one another throughout the study. 
Participants were given a set of typed instructions and 
told to raise either their right or left hand (depending 
upon which hemispheric presentation condition they 
were in) after they had finished reading. This set of instructions 
informed participants that they would be 
presented with a situation and that they would be asked 
their opinion regarding it. They also were told that information 
would be presented to them aurally and that, 
because context can sometimes influence opinions, they 
should look in the direction of the mark posted on the 
wall throughout the remainder of the experiment. The 
mark was posted either on the left (hemisphere presentation) 
or right side of the room (left hemisphere presentation). 
Having participants look in a particular 
direction is consistent with the procedure used by Drake 
(1987). The action of looking toward the right can facilitate 
activation of the left hemisphere, whereas the 
action of looking toward the left can facilitate activation 
of the right hemisphere (e.g., Galin & Ornstein, 1974; 
Kinsbourne, 1974). Presentation for the remainder of 
the study was in the form of the experimenter’s voice 
presented monaurally via headphones to either the left 
or right ear (e.g., Drake, 1993; Hiscock et al., 1985). All 
participants were presented monaurally with the Asian 
disease scenario (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
framed as either gains or losses. They were then instructed 
that after they made their decision, they were to 
indicate their choice on the piece of paper located in 
front of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Results and discussion: Experiment 2 
 
Four participants were excluded from the analysis 
because their score on our handedness questionnaire 
(Peters, 1998) indicated that they were primarily 
left-handed. We performed a 2 (hemispheric presentation) 
x 2 (gain/loss) nominal logistic v2 analysis of participants 
decisions. This analysis revealed a main effect 
for framing X2(1, N = 44) = 6.98, p < .01. More importantly, 
it also revealed the predicted hemisphere presentation 
(left versus right)_framing (gain versus loss) 
interaction, X2(1; N = 44) = 4.47, p < .05 (see Table 2).3 
To decompose this interaction, we performed a 
nominal logistic v2 analysis on participants’ decisions in 
each of the two hemisphere conditions. According to 
our predictions, participants in the left hemisphere 
condition should engage the information with a predominantly 
analytic processing style and as a result they 
should be relatively insensitive to the way in which the 
problem is framed. Participants in the right hemisphere 
condition, however, should engage the information with 
a very different processing style, referencing the context 
for the frame in which the information is presented. 
Consequently, their decisions should be heavily influenced 
by the way in which the problem is framed. 
As expected, we did not find a difference between the 
two framing conditions in the left hemisphere presentation 
(right ear) condition X2(1, N = 22) = .21, p > .6. 
Within this condition, regardless of framing, there was a 
general risk-aversion trend; participants made significantly 
more risk-averse choices than risk-seeking choices 
X2(1, N = 22) = 12.06, p < .001. 
 
Predictions for the right hemisphere presentation 
condition were also upheld. We found a significant main 
effect for framing in the right-hemisphere (left ear) presentation 
condition, X2(1, N = 22) = 8.47, p < .01. In 
the gains framing condition, participants chose the risk-averse 
option significantly more than the risk-seeking 
option, X2(1, N = 11) = 21.19, p < .001 whereas in the 
losses framing condition, they chose the risk-seeking 
option more often than the risk avoidant option, 
X2(1, N = 11) = 41.65, p < .001. 
 
These results converge with those obtained in Experiment 
1 and suggest that participants who process a 
decision task with a selectively activated right hemisphere 
are especially sensitive to the influence of contextual 
cues, such as the frame. Conversely, those 
participants who process a decision task with a selectively 
activated left hemisphere are not. 
 
 
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The results of both studies provide evidence that 
when participants perform a traditional type of framing 
task their ‘‘rational’’ pattern of response differs depending 
upon whether they process the task with an 
activated right or activated left hemisphere. We found 
that when participants performed the framing task under 
conditions that selectively activated the right hemisphere, 
they were especially sensitive to how the problem 
was framed. As a result, these participants demonstrated 
the predicted framing effects. We observed a much different 
pattern of responses from participants who performed 
the framing task with a selectively activated left 
hemisphere. Under these conditions, participants were 
especially sensitive to the information contained in the 
task and relatively less influenced by contextual factors, 
such as the frame. As a result, little or no framing effects 
were observed. 
 
 
4.1. Hemisphere activation and risk-taking 
 
Although our main question dealt with how framing 
effects were influenced by differential hemispheric activation, 
our findings provide information about the 
‘‘riskiness’’ of the respective hemispheres. Research by 
Drake (1985) and Drake and Ulrich (1992) found that 
participants who had a relatively activated or dominant 
left hemisphere tended to be more risk-seeking. In our 
studies, participants made a decision between two options 
framed either as gains or losses. When information 
was presented in this way, we saw that even though the 
decisions of individuals who had a relatively activated 
left hemisphere were not affected by the frame, their 
decisions did demonstrate an overall risk-averse tendency. 
On the other hand, the decisions of participants 
who had a relatively activated right hemisphere were 
affected by the frame; they demonstrated a risk-averse 
tendency when information was framed as a gain and a 
risk-seeking tendency when it was framed as a loss. 
Therefore, the relative ‘‘riskiness’’of the two hemispheres 
was influenced by the way in which the problem 
was framed. 
 
In the Drake studies, individuals who had a dominant 
or relatively activated left hemisphere were especially 
risk-seeking. However, the method of measuring risk 
was the subjective generation and interpretation of information; 
unlike in our studies, the information was 
not framed either as gains or losses and participants 
were not presented with a forced choice decision task. 
Therefore, one conclusion that can be drawn from these 
studies is that the tendency for individuals who have a 
relatively activated (or dominant) left hemisphere to be 
especially risk-seeking depends upon the method of risk 
assessment. Specifically, the pattern of riskiness may 
depend upon whether individuals are or are not influenced 
by the way in which the decision is framed. For 
example, when the task is not framed as either a gain or 
loss or when individuals are not influenced by the 
framing of the decision individuals who have a relatively 
activated (or dominant) left hemisphere may be especially 
risk-seeking. However, when individuals are influenced 
by the way in which the decision is framed (as a 
gain or loss) then results consistent with those obtained 
in the present studies should be observed. 
 
It also may be the case that even when individuals 
make subjective estimations and interpretations, the 
‘‘riskiness’’ of participants who have a relatively activated 
(or dominant) left hemisphere depends upon 
whether the information is framed in either positive 
(gains) or negative (losses) terms. If this possibility is 
correct then consistent with the findings of the present 
two studies, we should observe especially high levels of 
riskiness on the part of individuals who have relatively 
activated (or dominant) left hemispheres when information 
is framed in terms of gains but an opposite 
pattern should be observed when framed in terms of 
losses. 
 
In closing, it should be emphasized that, although the 
‘‘riskiness’’ issue provides direction for future research, 
it does not alter the primary message of the present 
paper. In both experiments, framing effects on a forced 
choice decision task were found when the right hemisphere 
was selectively activated. This was not the case 
for the left hemisphere. 
 
Therefore, on the one hand, we see a right hemisphere 
that contributes to problem analysis by providing 
a framework for interpreting the problem. This 
framework is elicited by a process that we term contextual 
referencing. Specifically, the right hemisphere 
has special sensitivity to cues that provide information 
about the context in which the problem is embedded. 
These cues then allow the right hemisphere to reference 
a particular framework that is associated with the 
current decision. 
On the other hand, we see the left hemisphere performing 
an analytic analysis of the information contained 
within the problem. We view the left hemisphere’s 
role as one that initially breaks information down into 
discreet analyzable parts. The information is then systematically 
evaluated in an orderly and logical fashion. 
Subsequent decisions are then especially sensitive to the 
strengths of the alternatives. Consequently, unlike the 
right hemisphere, we see the left hemisphere as relatively 
unaffected by contextual cues, such as the way in which 
the decision is framed. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. A possible limitation to our study might be participant’s choice of 
seating arrangement. For example, Karev (2000) found that when 
indicating where they would sit on a movie theatre map, all 
participants showed a bias toward the right side. However, right 
handers tended to be relatively more biased. This suggests that those 
individuals with a dominant left hemisphere might have selected 
themselves to sit more in the right finger tapping condition relative to 
left handers. We do not feel this poses a problem to our study. In fact, 
this would actually work against our hypothesis. Further, research by 
Drake and Ulrich (1992) found no relationship between classroom 
seating and line bisecting—a measure of hemispheric predominance. 
 
2. We performed an analysis to determine if there might be any 
effects for gender. The analysis revealed no effects X2(1, N = 48) =< 1, 
p > .8. However, these results are limited by the small number of males 
in our study. 
 
3. Similar to study 1, we performed an analysis to determine if there 
might be any effects for gender. The analysis revealed no effects 
X2(1, N = 44) =< 1, p > .5. These results are also limited by the small 
number of males in our study. 
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